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Christine Fountaine, was a plaintiff in the court below but is not involved in this
appeal.
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JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103O). Prior to
transfer, the Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-3102O).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1:

Appellant Gines contends that Defendant was late in producing

the expert report of his expert, Dr. Alan Goldman, and therefore Dr. Goldman's
testimony should have been excluded at trial. The issue for the court is whether
the trial court abused its discretion in finding the allegedly tardy production
harmless and allowing Dr. Goldman to testify.
Standard of review. The trial court's assessment of harmlessness is

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Coro/es v. State of Utah, 2015 UT 48, ,r 12.
Preservation. This issue was preserved below, R. 632. However, the

record on appeal does not include a transcript of the hearing in which the trial court
stated its findings, which the court expressly incorporated in its order.
Accordingly, the court's ruling must be presumed correct. See pp. 23-24, n. 7,

infra.
ISSUE 2:

The trial court permitted defendant's expert Dr. Goldman to

testify at trial that Mr. Gines suffered only temporary injuries in the accident, and
regarding the typical expenses associated with such injuries. Mr. Gines contends

1

that such testimony was not contained within Dr. Goldman's expert report and the
trial court should not have allowed it.
Preservation: This issue was preserved below. R. 1483, R. 1693 at

390:17-391:23, 414:1-416:13, 507:1-20.
Standard of review: A trial court's admission of expert testimony is

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45,

,r 10, 285 P. 3d

1168.
ISSUE 3:

As noted, Dr. Goldman opined that Mr. Gines's injuries were

temporary and estimated the expenses typically associated therewith. Mr. Gines
contends that Dr. Goldman did not have a non-arbitrary basis for this testimony
(which Mr. Gines refers to as "apportionment"). The issue for the Court is whether
the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Dr. Goldman laid sufficient
foundation for the testimony.
Preservation: This issue was preserved below. R. 414:1-416:13; R.

507:1-20.
Standard of review:

The trial court's admission of testimony is

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45,
1168.

2

,r 10, 285 P. 3d

ISSUE 4:

The trial court denied Mr. Gines's motion for a directed verdict

on the amount of medical economic damages. The issue for the court is whether
the court's ruling was an abuse of discretion.
Preservation: This issue was preserved. R. 1693, p. 507:1-20; R.

1580-1578.
Standard of review: The trial court's denial of a motion for directed

verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or new trial is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Johnson v. Montoya, 2012 UT App 199, if 7,308 P. 3d 566.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES

There are no such provisions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case, course ofproceedings, and disposition below

This is a Tier 2 personal injury action that arose when a vehicle driven by
Defendant, Sean Edwards, struck the rear of a vehicle in which plaintiff Garth
Gines was riding.

Prior to trial, the court found as a matter of law that the

accident was caused by defendant Edwards' negligence, and that Mr. Gines had
sustained some injury in the accident. The case was tried to a jury to determine the
amount of Mr. Gines's economic and non-economic damages caused by the
.JJ)

accident. The jury found that Mr. Gines had incurred Past Medical Expenses of

~
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$10,000, would incur $0 in future medical expenses due to the accident, and had
incurred $7,500 in non-economic damages.

Statement ofFacts Pertinent to the Appeal
On December 2, 2009, a car in which Mr. Gines was riding was rear-ended
by defendant Sean Edwards. Mr. Gines filed a Tier 2 negligence suit on April 24,
2012. (R. 1-5.)

Mr. Gines alleged that he "sustained serious injuries including, but not
limited to injury to his head, neck, back, arms and legs as well as other injuries
which are more fully documented in the medical records." (R. 38.) As Mr. Gines
notes, he experienced other injuries to his neck both before and after the accident.
(Gines Br., p. 5.)
During the course of litigation, the parties filed a series of motions in limine
relating to each other's expert witnesses. On February 25, 2014, Mr. Gines filed a
motion in limine seeking to exclude the testimony of Dr. Alan Goldman, who had
performed a medical examination of Mr. Gines pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 35 and had
been designated by Defendant as a retained expert.
Mr. Gines contended that Defendant had not provided a copy of Dr.
Goldman's Rule 35 examination report or a Rule 26 summary of Dr. Goldman's
opinions along with the data and other information upon which the retained expert
would rely. (R. 63-78.) Mr. Gines stated that he had opted to receive a report from

4

Dr. Goldman rather than take a deposition, and that the timing of the disclosure
was "far from harmless," arguing principally that "Defendant has had access to Dr.
Goldman's report since the end of 2012.
l;i$l

This wrongful withholding of Dr.

Goldman's report denied Plaintiffs and their experts to evaluate and meet the
issues raised by Dr. Goldman.

The Plaintiffs are also further harmed by this

systematic non-disclosure because, at best, it delays the ultimate resolution of their
claims. The Plaintiffs in this case have already waited in excess of four years ....
Worst case scenario, the Plaintiffs are further harmed by having to pay their own
experts more to review the new information, revise reports and perhaps hire
rebuttal experts late in the game, with shorter time frames for response." (R. 6362.)
In a response filed March 18, 2014, defendant stated that his counsel had
received an electronic Certificate of Service of a document titled "Plaintiffs
Elections Regarding Defendant's Experts," but had not received the actual election
itself and thus did not know whether Mr. Gines was electing a deposition or a
report.

(R. 188

,r

19, and R. 261; R. 178 ("Defendant did not produce Dr.

Goldman's expert report because his counsel did not receive the elections
regarding experts and still does not have this document.").)
Defendant attached a copy of Dr. Goldman's report to his response, stating,
J

"Plaintiff is entitled to an expert report or a deposition, but not both. Now that

~
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Defendant knows that Plaintiffs requested the reports they are being produced with
this memorandum." (R. 179, and R. 260-224 (initial and supplemental reports).)
Defendant argued that Mr. Gines had not shown prejudice from the timing
and that much of the four-year delay complained of by Mr. Gines was attributable
to Mr. Gines's own 2 ½-year delay in filing suit to begin with.

(R. 179.)

Defendant also noted that other harm claimed by Mr. Gines was no more harm
than Defendant had himself incurred earlier in allowing Mr. Gines to add his sister
as an additional plaintiff, which had resulted in delay and additional effort and
expense by Defendant's own expert. (R. 179.) Defendant noted that no trial date
had been set, and that he had agreed to any requested extension of discovery
deadlines. (R. 178.)
In response, Mr. Gines questioned the averment that Defendant's counsel
had not received the election document. Mr. Gines further argued that "Defendant
had an independent duty to affirmatively disclose Dr. Goldman's report under both
Rule 26 [expert disclosures] and Rule 35 [medical examination], absent of any
election of Plaintiffs."

(R. 295-296.)

Mr. Gines argued that, under Rule 35,

Defendant was required to provide a copy of the Rule 3 5 examination report even
if Mr. Gines did not elect a report under Rule 26. (R. 296-295.) Mr. Gines argued
that this alleged failure "was not cured in expert discovery.

6

Only after the

plaintiffs filed a motion seeking the exclusion of the evidence, did the Defendant
comply and disclose the reports." (R. 295.)
Mr. Gines's motion in limine regarding Dr. Goldman was argued to the trial
lab

court on April 28, 2014. (R. 304.) With respect to Dr. Goldman, the court stated
that "[t]he basis for the Court's ruling is set out in greater detail in the record of the

\Ji

hearing of April 28, 2014 .... For the reasons set forth in the record of the April 28
2014 hearing, it is hereby ordered adjudged and decreed as follows: . . . 2.
Defendant's failure to timely provide Dr. Alan Goldman's reports was harmless
and as such will not be excluded from providing testimony at trial in the above
matter." (R. 631, ,r,r 1-2.) 1
At a pretrial conference on May 19, 2014, the court scheduled trial to begin
October 8, 2014. (R. 306-309.)2
On June 9, 2014, Mr. Gines served a document titled "Plaintiffs Rule 26
Expert Disclosures - Rebuttal". (R. 311.) In this document, Mr. Gines named a
newly disclosed expert, Dr. Joel Dall, who was identified as testifying regarding
By contrast, the court granted Mr. Gines's simultaneous motion to exclude
Defendant's expert Dr. John Droge in his entirety, finding, "The Defendant failed
to provide Dr. John Droge's case and all of the data upon which his opinion was
based. The failure to provide the foundational data for Dr. Droge's opinions was
not harmless." (R. 631, ,r,r 2-3.)
1

The trial date was later moved back to October 27, 2014, to accommodate a
principal witness. (R. 312.)

2
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Mr. Gines's injuries, treatment, and prognosis. Mr. Gines later stipulated that he

would call Dr. Dall to testify solely with respect to the other plaintiff (Ms.
Fountaine), and would not ·seek to have Dr. Dall testify regarding Mr. Gines. (R.
384.)

The trial court ultimately permitted Dr. Dall to testify as to the other

plaintiffs injuries, finding the alleged late disclosure of Dr. Dall harmless. (R.
1514.)
Facts relating to "apportionment"
Defendant's expert Dr. Goldman concluded that Mr. Gines had incurred
some injuries in the car accident.

Dr. Goldman opined, however, that those

injuries had been temporary in nature, a short-term muscular "sprain" or "strain".
In his Rule 35 examination report (consisting of responses to a list of questions),
Dr. Goldman suggested that he did not believe there were any lasting effects from
the accident. Dr. Goldman opined that Mr. Gines had suffered injuries in the
motor vehicle accident, but that it would require a more in-depth review of
imagery to determine.
whether this was, as are most musculoskeletal dysfunctions, only a
temporary aggravation to [Mr. Gines's] previous progressive underlying and
altered anatomy/cervical spine disease which has continued to progress, and
probably would have even absent the 12-12-09 event.
(R. 231 ,I 6 (emphasis in original).)
The following question read, "If the accident in question is only partially
contributing to the current condition, please indicate and apportion the current
8

condition between this accident and other condition or events." Attempting to
answer this question although it was based upon a premise he had already rejected,
Dr. Goldman wrote:
Overall, if I was to assume that the 12-02-09 MV A may have caused a
permanent aggravation to Mr. Gines's pre-existent head and neck problems,
in light of his prior documented abnormalities with progression, I would
apportion 80% of his current symptomology to his pre-existing cervical
spine and headaches status and 20% to the MV A of 12-02-09. A final
answer to this question may have to wait for a closer review of Mr. Gines's
images.
(R. 231 ,I 6a (emphasis in original).)
Following a more-in depth review of the images, Dr. Goldman issued a
supplemental report reaffirming his opinion that none of the injuries sustained by
Mr. Gines in the accident were permanent, stating:
After carefully reviewing all of the answers in my 12-21-12 report, I do not
have a need to change any of those responses as a result of this image
review. As noted in my answer to question #6 (page 30), I did not note any
acute changes or significant progressions on the images following the 12-0209 MV A and, therefore, continue to feel that that event was a temporary
aggravation to his previous underlying progressive degenerative cervical
spine disease and altered cervical anatomy from his prior surgical
procedures.
(R. 224 (January 25, 2013 report (emphasis in original).)

Mr. Gines 's motion for partial summary judgment
On August 19, 2014, Mr. Gines moved for partial summary judgment
regarding causation.

Mr. Gines' s motion was based upon the anticipated trial

9

testimony of defendant's expert, Dr. Goldman, who had been permitted to testify
under the trial court's ruling at the April 28, 2014, hearing. Seep. 7, supra.
Mr. Gines argued that Dr. Goldman's expert report should be treated like a
deposition, and that "[t]he Defense's only expert Dr. Alan Goldman is limited to
his opinions raised in his expert report. His opinions in that report states that Mr.
Gines and Ms. Fountaine suffered injuries in this accident. Dr. Goldman is the
only witness the defendant has to rebut Plaintiff's claims of causation.

Dr.

Goldman ratifies both Plaintiffs' claims of injury. As such, the issue of causation
is not materially in dispute and should be decided as a matter oflaw." (R. 393.)3
In response, Defendant did not dispute Dr. Goldman's opinion that Mr.
Gines had incurred $61,296.60 in reasonable and necessary medical expenses
related to his condition. However, Defendant did dispute that Mr. Gines's medical
condition (and the resulting expenses) were all caused by the accident. Defendant
pointed to Dr. Goldman's opinion that Mr. Gines's injuries from the accident were
only temporary.

(R. 595-600.) "The jury should be permitted to decide what

injuries were caused by the accident and what treatment has been or will be
necessary in the future as a result of the accident," Defendant argued. (R. 595.)

See also R. 396 ("Areas where Dr. Goldman's opinions are favorable to the
Plaintiffs, no material dispute of fact exists and therefore should also be decided as
a matter of law instead of being submitted to the jury.")

3

10

The trial court found it undisputed that Defendant's negligence caused the
accident and fixed the amount of Mr. Gines's claimed past medical bills at
$61,296.60. (See Gines Br., p. 7.) The court further found it undisputed that "Mr.
Gines suffered at least a musculoskeletal injury to the cervical spine, of the
sprain/strain variety with a temporary aggravation and superimposition upon a
previously injured and altered symptomatic cervical spine anatomy." (R. 1481,

,r,r

1-2.)
The court found that "[ w]hether Mr. Gines suffered more serious injury as a
result of this accident, is factually disputed." (R. 1481

,r,r 1-2, 6.)

The court also

found a factual dispute as to whether Mr. Gines needed future medical care as a
result of the accident. (R. 1480 ,r,r 7-8.)4
At trial, both Mr. Gines's and Defendant's counsel told the jury it was
undisputed that Mr. Gines needed the medical care he had received, including his
surgery. The issue for the jury was whether, and how much, of that care was
needed because of the accident. (R. 1690, pp. 115:4-11, R. 121: 14-24.)
During the trial, two issues arose about the scope of Dr. Goldman's
anticipated testimony.

Before allowing Dr. Goldman to testify, the trial court

As Mr. Gines summarizes it, "The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion for
partial summary judgment as it found disputed issues of material fact regarding the
amount of medical bills related to the accident and the need for future medical
care. (R.632)." (Gines Br., p. 7.)

4
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heard argument from the parties. The court also ordered Defendant to put Dr.
Goldman on the stand outside the presence of the jury in a "Rule 104" proceeding
to hear the anticipated testimony and cross-examination. (R. 1693, p. 391, pp. 399416.)

Mr. Gines's first objection was to Dr. Goldman estimating the cost of
reasonable treatment for the temporary injuries he believed Mr. Gines had
sustained in the accident.

(R. 1693 pp.

390-391, 395-396.)

Although Dr.

Goldman had described such treatment itself in his expert report, he had not
included specific dollar figures. (Id., pp. 396-397.)
Defendant argued that there was no surprise as to the numbers associated
with the described treatment of Mr. Gines's temporary injuries, and that Mr.
Gines' s counsel was experienced and knowledgeable about the customary charges
for that type of treatment. (R. 1693, p. 398: 10-399: 17. )5

5

"[T]hey deal with this every day in every case that they have. They know, they
know what physical therapy costs. They know what chiropractic costs." (R. 1693,
p. 398:10-13.) "I would submit to the court that this is harmless because we are
dealing with very, very experienced personal injury attorneys. And they routinely
present damages for all of their various clients who have been treated by all
different kinds of doctors. Physical therapists, chiropractors·, orthopedic surgeons,
neurologists. I mean, whole gamut. They know what these things cost. It really it's harmless omission not to have that information there. They are not going to be
shocked. When they look at the information that is in his report about what
treatment he did think was necessary, they know from their prior experience from
having done this for years and years, they can figure out, ballpark it pretty easily
what that costs." (R. 1693, p. 399: 4-17.)

12

-~.

The trial court asked Gines' s counsel if it was claiming surprise with respect
to the cost of the common procedures:
[THE COURT]: Let me just ask you. You have done this work for a
long time. Are you really surprised about what a physical therapist charges?
This goes to the harmlessness issue .... [A]re you really surprised what a
physical therapist charges?
[COUNSEL]: Am I surprised?
THE COURT: Yes. And it goes to the harmlessness. You guys do
this work a lot. And so, it seems to me that it wouldn't be much of a
surprise for you to know that a physical therapist charges between 100 and
$150 an hour, or per visit. Is that true? I mean, I just need a candid response
to that.
[COUNSEL]: The candid response to that, Your Honor, is, no, I'm
not surprised. Now, as far as the numbers he picked THE COURT: Yeah.
surprised in terms of what-

And I get that.

Yeah, that you may be

[COUNSEL]: I'm surprised as to what his testimony actually is.
Because before today I didn't know what he was going to answer to that
question. So, in that aspect I am surprised.

(R. 1693, pp. 412:13 -413:22.)
Mr. Gines's next objection was to what he characterized as testimony
regarding "apportionment," arguing that it was not mentioned in Dr. Goldman's
report and that Dr. Goldman did not have a non-arbitrary basis for "apportioning"

Mr. Gines's damages.
Defendant pointed out that what Dr. Goldman was doing was not
"apportionment" as Mr. Gines seemed to be using the term. Dr. Goldman was not
13

apportioning between contributing causes of a permanent (current) condition.
Rather, he would simply be reaffirming the opinion in his report that the accident
caused only temporary injuries, which had no lasting effects:
[B]ecause the apportionment opinion is, he says, if I were to assume that he
has a permanent disability then I would apportion 80/20. But he says, but
that's not his opinion. His opinion is that it was a temporary aggravation of
his already preexisting and degenerating worsening condition, therefore,
apportionment doesn't even apply. He says it's just a temporary aggravation
of a sprain/strain injury superimposed upon this already degenerating spine.
So, there is no apportionment.
(R. 1693, pp. 388-389.) See also id., p. 389 ("after a certain amount of time [Mr.
Gines] would have gone back to baseline back to where he was right before the
accident"), pp. 396-397 ("100 percent of what he is experiencing now is simply
due to his preexisting condition.

Because Dr. Goldman has committed to the

position that this is temporary.

This injury had a temporary effect on [Mr.

Gines].")
In the alternative (if the accident-related injuries were not temporary),
Defendant stated that Dr. Goldman would estimate that 20 percent of Mr. Gines's
condition was attributable to the accident. During his Rule 104 testimony, Dr.
Goldman testified that, when a doctor does an apportionment, "it's a common
sense thing. I mean, if you've got someone that's had a preexisting condition, you
have to figure in how could that affect his current status. And sometimes it's just
kind of picking numbers out of the air. So, there's no specific, you know, recipe, if

14

you will." (R. 1693, p. 408:2-14.) Shortly afterward, Dr. Goldman clarified, "I
didn't say I picked numbers out. I say sometimes one does pick numbers out of the
a1r. There is no recipe." (R. 1693, p. 409:8-13.)
Dr. Goldman explained that apportionments are guided by the American
Medical Association Guides for permanent impairment, which provide ranges for
vj

subjective and objective findings; the "arbitrary" numbers are still within the
prescribed ranges - "you pick a number out of that range." (R. 1693, pp. 410:15 412:3.)
After taking a recess to consider the issue, the court returned with a ruling
partially sustaining and partially overruling Mr. Gines' s objection to Dr.
Goldman's anticipated testimony.

The court ruled that "I agree with defense

counsel that apportionment is not an issue. It is defendant's position that no part of

Mr. Gines's condition today is attributable to the accident. That, at best, Mr. Gines
suffered a temporary or, at worse, he suffered a temporary aggravation of a
'J

preexisting condition." (R. 1693, p. 414:13-18.)
The court further stated that, with respect to his apportionment estimate if

Mr. Gines' s accident-related injuries were permanent, Dr. Goldman had a
reasonable basis because
that apportionment is based on the American Medical Association
Guidelines which provide a range of percentages from which practitioners
must choose. That discretionary decision is informed by the practitioner's
examination, training and experience. And while I agree that that's not a
15

precise science, this is the system relied upon in tort litigation, and by
government to do this work. It's the best system that we have to assess these
determinations. And for that reason, I conclude that adequate foundation has
been laid for Dr. Goldman to testify about apportionment. Zero percent if
we are talking about a temporary aggravation and 20 percent if we are, if
permanent is where we are.
(R. 1693, pp. 414:21-415:8.)
The court barred Dr. Goldman from testifying as to what treatment would
have been reasonable and necessary for a person with Mr. Gines's altered anatomy
because that opinion was not fairly encompassed within his report. (R. 1693, p.
415 :9-23.) The court ruled that Dr. Goldman could testify as to the diagnostic
costs and treatment that a healthy person who suffered a temporary sprain/strain of
the cervical spine would normally receive, and the estimated costs thereof. (Id., p.
415 :9-14.)

The court found that "the failure to disclose the progression rate

generally charged by physical therapists ... is harmless. Counsel are experienced
attorneys who litigate tort cases, and this is generally known to them." (Id., pp.
415:24 -416:2.)
When the trial resumed, Dr. Goldman took the stand. Neither party elicited
from Dr. Goldman his alternative apportionment opinion (that if the accident were
assumed to have caused permanent injury, Dr. Goldman would attribute about 20
percent of Mr. Gines' s present condition to the accident and the rest to preexisting
conditions). (R. 1693, pp. 417-465, passim.)

16

Instead, Dr. Goldman's testimony focused on his opinion that Mr. Gines's
injuries from the accident were temporary, meaning they would have lasted less
than six months. Dr. Goldman testified that "Acute" (as he had characterized Mr.
Gines's injuries in his report) meant that for "several weeks or a month or two" it
would bother the patient, after which it would start to diminish and be largely back
vJ

to normal within a six-month window of time. (R. 1693, pp. 429:9 - 430:15, pp.
433:5 - 434:3; see also p. 462:2-12 ("I can't tell you when it ended. I can just tell
you that most musculoligamentous injuries within a three to six month maximum
time do resolve and come back to their baseline. That would be the guideline I
would use."). 6
On cross-examination, Dr. Goldman was asked, "[A]s a doctor, how do you
normally define temporary as opposed to permanent?"

Dr. Goldman replied,

"Usually, when you go out six months, you talk about chronic or permanent. So,
anything within a six month window of time. And this is a little bit arbitrary. But
l,(ji)

that's, most of the definitions is usually past six months. Some people say past
three months." (R. 433:13-19.)

On cross-examination, Mr. Gines asked Dr. Goldman how long temporary or
acute injuries took to recover with other patients who had preexisting conditions
similar to (and "even worse things" than) Mr. Gines. Dr. Goldman stated that,
with those patients, it had resolved "usually within a three of four, maximum six
month window of time they had gone back to baseline." (See R. 1693, pp. 464:25465:23.)

6
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Dr. Goldman testified as to the general treatment that would be expected for
the type of temporary sprain/strain experienced by Mr. Gines.

Dr. Goldman

opined that the total costs would be about "7, 8,000, $10,000, something like that."
(R. 1693, pp. 430: 16-431 :7.) On cross-examination, Dr. Goldman agreed that Mr.

Gines had altered anatomy, and that he was not opining as to what treatment would
have been required for someone with such altered anatomy. (Id., pp. 445:9-446:8.)
Consistent with his report, Dr. Goldman opined that it was difficult to define what
actual treatments would have been of assistance in light of Mr. Gines' s preexisting
"markedly anatomically altered" cervical spine. (Id., p. 605 :2-11.)
On redirect, Dr. Goldman testified without objection that treatment would
not differ materially between someone with Mr. Gines's type of preexisting
conditions and someone without such conditions. (R. 1693, pp. 457:8-458:5.) The
principal difference, Dr. Goldman explained, might be that (for example) if the
patient said he could not bend to the left, then a different method would be used to
stretch those muscles.

"You are doing the same thing, but you may have a

limitation to what you are able to do because of the patient's condition. But the
approach to it is exactly the same." (Id., p. 457:8-23.) If anything, Dr. Goldman
said, the cost of treatment might be less for someone with Mr. Gines's anatomy,
because the treatment might not be as extensive or use the same modalities. (Id.,
pp. 458:21-459:5.)
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Dr. Goldman testified that Mr. Gines needed the surgery that he underwent,
but not because of the car accident. (R. 1693, pp. 459:13--460:15.) Consistent
with his opinion that Mr. Gines had suffered only temporary injuries in the
accident, Dr. Goldman also opined that no future medical treatment was needed
due to the accident. (Id., pp. 434:4--435:12.)
On cross-examination, Mr. Gines questioned Dr. Goldman about his
testimony that, in defining an injury as "temporary" versus "permanent," "this is a
little bit arbitrary." (Seep. 17, supra.) Dr. Goldman explained that, when he uses
the word "arbitrary," he means that a physician is choosing between alternatives
depending upon the circumstances:
What I said was, that when you see a patient and you know that they have
pneumonia, and you know that penicillin will treat pneumonia, but they are
allergic to penicillin, so, arbitrarily, you decide, well, I better pick another
antibiotic, maybe Keflex, maybe vancomycin. That's what this is all about.
If a gentleman comes in and we are going to do physical therapy or whatever
we are going to do, and he can't do it because of his altered anatomy, his
pain, his this, his that, then you decide to do something else. That's an
arbitrary decision. There's no message on the wall that says if you can't do
A you have to do B. You are a doctor. You have had experience. You do
what's best for the patient. If you want to call that arbitrary, if I use the
word arbitrary, what it means is you think about what's going on. And you
pick the right thing for that patient.
(R. 1693, pp. 448:7--449:5; see also pp. 447:24--448:6 (explaining that he was not
"pick[ing] something out of the air," that his testimony was to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty, and suggesting that Mr. Gines's counsel was playing "a word
game" with the word "arbitrary").)
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At the conclusion of the evidence, the court instructed the jury that "Garth
Gines has incurred medical expenses in the amount of $61,296.60. The Defendant
does not stipulate that all of those expenses were caused by Sean Edward's
negligence." (R. 1493 (Instr. 15).) The court also instructed the jury, "It has been
conclusively determined that the medical expenses claimed by ... Garth Gines was
reasonable and necessary." (R. 1534 (Instr. 31).)
The court gave the jury a Special Verdict Form with "Yes" filled in for
whether defendant Sean Edwards was at fault and "Was Sean Edward's fault a
cause of Garth Gine's [sic] harm?" (R. 1560.) With respect to Gines, the jury
filled in the verdict form:

Past Medical Expenses $10,000.00; Future Medical

Expenses $0.00; Non-economic damages $7,500.00; Total $17,500. (R. 1559.)
Gines filed a "motion for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and/or motion for a new trial on damages." (R. 1580.) In pertinent part,
Gines argued that Dr. Goldman had unfairly been permitted to testify at trial
outside the scope of his report, and that "Garth Gines is entitled to a directed
verdict on the issue of special damages, because the Defendant failed to provide
the jury with a non-arbitrary basis for apportioning damages.~' (R. 1579.) The trial
court denied the motion (R. 1674 ), and Mr. Gines timely appealed.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court should affirm the jury's verdict and the district court's rulings
because the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of
01

Defendant's expert Alan Goldman, M.D. Initially, because Mr. Gines failed to
order a transcript of the April 28, 2014, hearing during which the district court

VJ

articulated the basis for its order regarding the admissibility of Dr. Goldman's
testimony, Mr. Gines failed to provide an adequate evidentiary record on appeal
for assessing the claimed abuse of discretion. Based upon such, the district court's
ruling must be presumed to be correct.
Moreover, even if the Court reaches the merits of Mr. Gines's contentions,
the proceedings below should nonetheless be affirmed. The trial court properly
admitted Dr. Goldman's testimony based upon its finding that the timing of
Defendant's disclosure of Dr. Goldman's report was harmless to Mr. Gines. Mr.
Gines has failed to establish on appeal any abuse of discretion on the part of the
district court in admitting Dr. Goldman's testimony where Mr. Gines failed to
discuss the facts pertinent to the cause of ongoing delay in the lawsuit and the lack
of prejudice to Mr. Gines, and where Mr. Gines himself relied upon Dr. Goldman's
testimony and opinions to obtain affirmative rulings in his favor.
Nor has Mr. Gines established that the district court abused its discretion
when it limited the scope of Dr. Goldman's testimony at trial. The district court's
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ruling should be affirmed because Mr. Gines has not marshalled the evidence in
support of the jury's findings. Indeed, Mr. Gines has not identified any evidentiary
basis for a finding that the district court erred by admitting either Dr. Goldman's
opinion that Mr. Gines's injury was temporary or regarding what the expected
treatment would be for a normal person. Further, Mr. Gines cannot show prejudice
as a result of the trial court's allowing Dr. Goldman to testify regarding the
reasonable value of medical treatment that Mr. Gines received that was related to
the accident. Because Mr. Gines did not offer any of his own evidence at trial
regarding the amount of medical expenses that would be attributable to his
temporary neck sprain/strain (i.e., the actual injury the jury found that Mr. Gines
sustained), the jury likely would have awarded Mr. Gines nothing had it not heard
Dr. Goldman's testimony on that point.
The same goes for Mr. Gines's criticisms regarding Dr. Goldman's
testimony about estimates of costs for the type of treatment typically prescribed for
similar injuries. The trial court disagreed, partly on the basis that Mr. Gines' s own
counsel admitted that he was not surprised by the cost figures Dr. Goldman opined.
Finally, Mr. Gines has not established that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for directed verdict, JNOV, or new trial. Harris v.

Shopko, 2013 UT 34 is inapplicable here because Mr. Gines's injuries from the
accident were temporary. In lawsuits involving temporary injuries that resolve
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themselves over time, there by definition is nothing to "apportion." Harris is
simply inapplicable to a temporary injury that does not contribute at all to the
patient's current condition.

ARGUMENT

I.

MR. GINES HAS NOT MET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ALLOWING
DR. GOLDMAN TO TESTIFY.
Mr. Gines' s first argument on appeal is that "the trial court abused its

discretion when it found the non-disclosure of Dr. Goldman's report to be
harmless."

(Gines Br., p. 18.)

Mr. Gines acknowledges that the report was

disclosed long before trial (and thus was allegedly tardy rather than non-disclosed).
Mr. Gines further acknowledges that the trial court "found the non-disclosure of
his report until March 18, 2014 to be harmless." (Gines Br., p. 19.) Mr. Gines
argues, however, that "[ s]uch a finding of harmlessness is without reasonable
basis." Id.
There are several independently dispositive problems with Mr. Gines's
argument. First, the record on appeal is not sufficient to evaluate the trial court's
ruling, which therefore must be presumed correct. 7 The trial court held a hearing

See e.g. In re H.M, 2007 UT App 257 (per curiam) (affirming trial court's ruling
where appellant failed to provide an adequate record on appeal by not ordering
hearing transcripts; "Without an adequate record, this court must presume the
regularity of the proceedings below.") (citing State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24,113,
7
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on this issue and (according to the court's order) made findings during that April
28, 2014, hearing. Those oral findings were later incorporated by reference into
the challenged order. See p. 7, supra. There is no transcript of that hearing in the
record, however.

It is therefore impossible for this Court to know what was

presented to the trial court, what the court found, or why the court exercised its
discretion as it did. It is similarly impossible to say that the trial court abused that
discretion.
Second, although Mr. Gines restates his arguments as to why the timing of
the disclosure was not harmless, he fails to even acknowledge - let alone rebut Defendant's arguments to the contrary. Seep. 6, supra (summarizing defendant's
arguments regarding Mr. Gines causing much of his own delay, lack of prejudice,
and similarity to "harm" incurred by Defendant in allowing Mr. Gines's sister to be
added to the lawsuit). The exercise of discretion by a trial court involves the
weighing of competing considerations. Mr. Gines's brief does not address any of
the competing considerations regarding (lack of) prejudice from the allegedly late
report.

By definition, he has failed to meet his burden of proving abuse of

discretion.

69 P.3d 1278); see also U.R.A.P. 1 l(e )(2) ("If the appellant intends to urge on
appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence,
the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such
finding or conclusion.").
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Third, Mr. Gines cannot show prejudice because Mr. Gines himself
affirmatively relied on Dr. Goldman's testimony to obtain summary judgment in
his favor on two important issues: 1) that Mr. Gines had suffered injuries in the
accident, and 2) that Mr. Gines's medical expenses were reasonable and necessary.

See pp. 9-10, supra. Mr. Gines cannot both claim prejudice from Dr. Goldman
ll)

being allowed to testify at all while simultaneously relying on Dr. Goldman to
prove his own case.

II.

MR. GINES HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE
SCOPE OF DR. GOLDMAN'S TRIAL TESTIMONY.
In Point II of his brief, Mr. Gines argues that the trial court improperly

permitted Dr. Goldman to testify "outside his report in three material ways". The
entirety of Mr. Gines's argument is this:
The court permitted Dr. Goldman to tell the jury that Mr. Gines suffered a
mere temporary sprain/strain injury. The court permitted Dr. Goldman to
tell the jury what reasonable and necessary treatment would be for a person
without altered cervical anatomy. The court did not allow Dr. Goldman to
testify as to what treatment would have been necessary for a person with Mr.
Gines' s altered anatomy.
At trial, Dr. Goldman testified that reasonable and necessary medical
treatment for a normal person would amount to approximately $10,000. (R.
1693 at431:14-432:l-7).
This number was not contained in his report. It was a complete and total
surprise. It is absolutely certain this testimony hurt the plaintiffs ability to
rebut Dr. Goldman's opinions and is directly reflected in the jury's award of
$10,000 for medical economic damages.
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(Gines Br., p. 22.)
There are, again, several problems with Mr. Gines's contentions. Initially,
Mr. Gines makes no effort to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's
findings, which Mr. Gines characterizes as "speculat[ive]," "against the weight of
the evidence," "arbitrary," "not supported by the evidence," and "no[t] rational."
(Gines Br., pp. 28, 29.) While failure to marshal is not an automatic ground for
affirmance, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that an appellant who fails to
marshal will rarely meet its burden of proof on appeal. That is the case here.
Dr. Goldman's opinion that Mr. Gines's injury was temporary was expressly
contained within his report, see pp. 8-9, supra, and there was no error in allowing
him to restate that opinion at trial. 8
With respect to Dr. Goldman's testimony regarding what the treatment
would be for a normal person, it is again hard to see any abuse of discretion,
particularly when the judge also required him to tell the jury that Mr. Gines did not
have normal physiology, and Dr. Goldman explained the principal differences
between treatment of a normal person and treatment of someone like Mr. Gines

8

For the same reason, there is no basis for Mr. Gines's averment that Dr. Goldman
"recanted at trial and stated 0% of Mr. Gines's current condition was attributable to
the accident." (See Gines Br., p. 24 n.2.) Dr. Goldman had been stating that all
along.
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and why treatment of someone with altered anatomy could be less expensive. See
p. 18, supra.
Nor has Mr. Gines shown prejudice from this alleged error.
vJ

Mr. Gines

argues that the jury must have unthinkingly accepted Dr. Goldman's testimony
because Dr. Goldman mentioned $10,000 and the jury awarded $10,000 in past

v,

medical expenses. (Gines Br., p. 22, and p. 26 Gury was "completely confused"
and "10,000 is a complete nonsense answer to that question").)

v;

Mr. Gines overlooks a couple of key points:

First, Dr. Goldman's trial

testimony was actually "7, 8, or $10,000". See p. 18, supra. If the jury simply
plowed ahead unthinkingly, why did it not pick $7,000 rather than $10,000?
There is a more fundamental problem with any claim of prejudice. The jury
found that Mr. Gines suffered only temporary injuries in the accident (hence the
lack of future medical expenses). It was Mr. Gines's burden to prove what the
reasonable and necessary expenses were for the injuries as found by the jury
~

(temporary neck strain), not the injuries he wished the jury to find (all of Mr.
Gines' s present neck injuries). Mr. Gines presented no evidence of his own for the
expenses associated with the injuries actually found by the jury. Ironically, but for
Dr. Goldman's testimony, the jury could well have awarded Mr. Gines nothing for
his temporary injury due to a complete lack of evidence as to the expenses
associated with such an injury.
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Mr. Gines also overlooks an alternative basis upon which the jury could
have reached its conclusion. Mr. Gines's own brief provides this summary: "Mr.
Gines's medical expenses the day before his surgery only totaled $6,021.90.
Immediately after his surgery, his medical bills totaled $56,730.04." (Gines Br., p.
29.) Using Mr. Gines's own figures, once the jury concluded that the surgery was
not caused by the accident, it could well have performed this mathematical
calculation from his own evidence: $56,730.04 (expenses immediately after Mr.
Gines's surgery) -$6,021.90 (medical expenses the day before Mr. Gines's surgery,
which likely included preparation for the surgery)= at least $50,708.14 in surgeryrelated costs. Subtracting $50,708.14 from $61,296.60 (stipulated total medical
expenses) = $10,588.46, a figure quite close to the jury's final award of past
medical expenses.

Mr. Gines simply has not established prejudice from the

allegedly improper testimony. 9
Finally, Mr. Gines takes issue with the trial court's reason for allowing Dr.
Goldman to offer cost estimates for the type of treatment typically prescribed for
similar injuries.

In particular, Mr. Gines criticizes the court's mention of his

counsel's experience when assessing notice or lack of prejudice. This criticism, of
The jury heard other evidence along the same lines. For example, Mr. Gines's
expert testified that the hospital component of the surgery alone would be up to
$40,000 of Gines' $61,296.60 in medical expenses, that the surgical
anesthesiologist's bill would be in the range of $2,500, etc. (R. 1691, p. 199:21203:5.) See also Trial Exhibits 1, 2, and 7 (all of Mr. Gines' medical records).

9
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course, suffers from the same lack of prejudice as discussed above. But in any
event, it is unfair. The court asked for a "candid" response to whether counsel was
truly surprised by the numbers, and was told no. See p. 13, supra. It is not an
abuse of discretion for a court to ask an attorney to be candid.

See, e.g.,

U.R.Prof.C. 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal). Moreover, Mr. Gines's counsel had
~

himself cited his experience to the jury in opening statement, remarking, "I've
been doing this for 30 plus years, and over a hundred jury trials."

(R. 1690,

p.111 :3-4.) It cannot be an abuse of discretion for a trial court to consider the same
fact that a party has asked the jury to consider.

III.
v>

MR. GINES HAS NOT SHOWN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY
THE TRIAL COURT IN DENYING HIS MOTION FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR
NEW TRIAL.
In Point III of his brief, Mr. Gines argues that "the trial court erred when it

denied plaintiff's multiple motion~ for judgment as a matter of law on
apportionment and medical economic damages." (Gines Br., p. 22.) Much of this
point consists of reargument from Points I and II; the responses to those arguments
above are incorporated herein.
Mr. Gines argues in Point III that Defendant had the burden to apportion
Gines's damages between those attributed to his preexisting cervical spine
condition and those attributed to the injury arising from the auto accident. He
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argues that Defendant failed to adduce a non-arbitrary basis for the jury to so
apportion. (Gines Br., p. 23, citing Harris v. Shopko, 2013 UT 34, ~~ 28-38.)
As discussed above, however, Harris apportionment was not even at issue if
the jury believed Defendant's theory of the case, i.e., that Gines's injuries from the
accident were temporary. Much like a sprained ankle might cause discomfort for a
while but the patient then "retum[s] to the baseline," as Dr. Goldman puts it, the
jury was free to believe that Gines suffered a similarly short-term neck strain.
With a person who suffers an acute/temporary injury, there is nothing to
"apportion" in the sense argued by Gines.

Instead, the question is what the

reasonable and necessary medical expenses are associated with that temporary
injury. For example, a broken leg might require an x-ray, doctor's visit, pain
medication, etc., for a short period.

"Whiplash" might require some physical

therapy for a short period. A plaintiff would be entitled to the reasonable cost of
such treatment, but no more. That is what Defendant here argued, and what the
jury believed.

See, e.g., R. 1559 (special verdict awarding no future medical

expenses). 10

Mr. Gines did offer his own expert testimony that the accident caused permanent
injury. But the jury was free to choose between conflicting expert testimony or
even to disregard such testimony. See R. 1491-1492 (Instr. 17, 18) and R. 1431,
1434 (Gines requesting those instructions).) Additionally, Mr. Gines's expert
admitted that his opinions were based in large part upon subjective reports by Mr.
Gines (of pain, etc.). (R. 1691, pp. 181:1-182:7.) At trial, Defendant impeached
10
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Mr. Gines's position is not supported, let alone compelled, by Harris v.

Shopko. Harris was focused on proximate cause. This Court initially held that a
preexisting condition cannot be said to be "proximate" if it ( 1) exists and (2) is
asymptomatic.

On certioriari, the Supreme Court bifurcated these predicates.

Just because a condition is asymptomatic does not mean that it does not contribute
to the ultimate injury; it could very well contribute. Thus, an expert would be
needed to present this information to the jury so that it could decide, with expert
assistance, whether a preexisting injury, symptomatic or not, is partially
responsible for the patient's current condition. Harris has nothing to do with a
temporary injury that does not contribute at all to the patient's current condition.
See, e.g., Rowe v. Munye, 702 N. W.2d 729 (Minn. 2005) (in determining whether
the defendant or plaintiff had the burden to demonstrate the apportionment of
damages to a preexisting injury and a subsequent injury, the issue of whether the
second injury was merely temporary, or a permanent aggravation of the prior
condition, was crucial).
Even if Harris had some bearing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that Dr. Goldman had adequate foundation for his opinions (i.e., that
they were not arbitrary). Mr. Gines's repeated citations to the word "arbitrary" in
Gines' credibility extensively with conflicting statements, including several
instances in which Mr. Gines seemed to be contradicting his own doctors. (E.g., R.
1692, pp. 330-345.)
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Dr. Goldman's testimony ignores Dr. Goldman's own clarification of what he-the
witness himself - meant when he used the word. Seep. 19, supra.
Mr. Gines' s principal complaint on this point is to claim that Dr. Goldman
"did not testify when Mr. Gines's temporary aggravation ended ... " (Gines Br., p.
27; also id., p. 28 ("Dr. Goldman simply did not tell the jury when Mr. Gines's
injury ended.") While Mr. Gines fails to demonstrate why this would be material,
it is incorrect in any event. Dr. Goldman opined repeatedly that Mr. Gines's injury
was "acute" or "temporary," meaning that it lasted a couple of months, less than
six. See p. 17, supra. While Mr. Gines says that Dr. Goldman did not render such
an opinion as to patients with conditions similar to Mr. Gines's, he actually did; as
mentioned above, on cross-examination, Dr. Goldman was asked that question, and
reiterated that - even for patients with "worse" conditions - they recovered within
a couple of months. See p. 17, n. 6, supra.

IV.

MR. GINES HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT.
Mr. Gines' s fourth issue on appeal (as identified in his Statement of Issues)

complains of the trial court's denial of his motion for directed verdict. All of the
issues upon which that motion was based have been addressed above; in short, no
abuse of discretion or other error has been shown.
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, defendant Sean Edwards respectfully
requests the Court to affirm the trial court's judgment on jury verdict.
DATED this 9th day of December, 2015.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Appellee
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